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I            n its effort to develop the automotive
industry, the Philippine government has
adopted local content requirement and
protectionist policies for almost thirty years.
However, these policies have resulted in very
limited localization as the automotive assem-
blers encountered difficulties in achieving the
local content requirements set by the govern-
ment.
In the 1990s, the assembly sector was opened
up to accommodate new players. At the same
time, previous restrictions on the number of
models that could be assembled were re-
moved. The industry was also liberalized to
allow the importation of all types of motor
vehicles. In July 2003, the government com-
pletely abandoned its local content program.
Tariff on completely built unit (CBU) imports
was reduced from 100 percent prior to the
1980s to 70 percent in 1981 and to 50
percent in 1982. This was further reduced to
40 percent in 1993 and then to 30 percent in
2000. With the country’s commitment to the
ASEAN Free Trade Area–Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT) scheme, tariffs
were reduced to five percent in 2005 and are
scheduled to be completely eliminated by
2010.
Volume, particularly in view of the current
weak domestic demand, has been a major
internal problem among local assemblers in
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terms of reducing costs and improving their
competitiveness. Compounding this is the
absence of a strong supplier base in the
country. Thus, the firms have remained highly
dependent on imported components and parts
which continue to add up to their rising costs
of production.
The automotive industry is a highly competi-
tive and technology-intensive industry. It
requires large economies of scale and a high
degree of specialization in parts and compo-
nents manufacturing. The global operations of
the automotive industry are highly complex
and frequently integrated within the strate-
gies of multinational organizations. With the
industry’s globalization thrust, automotive
parts and component manufacturing has
located in many countries while automotive
assembly has concentrated mainly in coun-
tries that have large domestic markets and
that serve as platforms for regional exports.
In terms of demand for the automotive
industry’s products, consumers want a large
variety of models at competitive prices.
This Policy Notes is therefore a call for imme-
diate government action in crafting temporary
adjustment measures in preparation for the
zero tariff environment under the AFTA by
2010. Equally important is the need to
formulate, in coordination with the industry, a
comprehensive program and a coherent set of
policies to help the industry adjust efficiently
and benefit from the globalization process.
Economic structure and performance
of the industry
Assembly firms
The Philippine automotive industry originally
consisted of 14 car assemblers with a com-
bined annual capacity of 221,450 units and
21 commercial vehicle assemblers with a total
capacity of 145,950 units. In 2002, the
Chamber of Automotive Manufacturers of the
Philippines (CAMPI) reported that the assem-
bly sector generated a total investment of
around P40 billion and total employment of
15,000 workers.
Currently, only five of the 14 registered car
assemblers are still engaged in auto manufac-
turing. Some, like the Asian Carmakers and
Scandinavian, have shifted their operations to
importing and distribution. The industry is
dominated by five Japanese firms, namely,
Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi, Isuzu, and Nissan,
and one American manufacturer, i.e., Ford.
The share of the industry leader, Toyota, has
been consistently increasing from 28.9
percent in 2002 to 38 percent in 2007.
In 2007, the Philippine automotive industry
sold a total of 117,903 vehicles, the highest
The automotive industry is a highly competitive and
technology-intensive industry. It requires large
economies of scale and a high degree of specialization
in parts and components manufacturing. The global
operations of the automotive industry are highly
complex and frequently integrated within the strategies
of multinational organizations.PN 2008-02
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sales registered after the 1997 Asian
financial crisis (Table 1). This, however, is
still below the peak sales of 162,095 units
reached in 1996. While our ASEAN neigh-
bors started to recover in the early 2000s,
the Philippines has continued to lag
behind. As Figure 1 shows, the Philippines
has the smallest sales volume, with Vietnam
catching up as its sales increased tremen-
dously from 47,000 units in 2006 to 92,000
in 2007 (representing a remarkable increase
of 97 percent).
In the last four years, domestic assembly
operations have been declining. As Table 1
shows, the number of domestically as-
sembled vehicles sold dropped from 85,388
units in 2003 to 61,128 units in 2007.




have become very costly.
With the reduction of
tariffs to five percent
under the AFTA-CEPT,
imports of domestic firms
as a proportion of total
industry sales have
increased substantially
from 8 percent in 2003 to
48 percent of total sales
in 2007.
Based on the manufacturing data from the
National Statistics Office (NSO), the automo-
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Figure 1. ASEAN industry sales, 1996–2007 (in units)
Source: Ford Philippines (2007), Developments in the automotive industry: Philippines and ASEAN.
turing value added reached 3.2 percent during
the period 1976–1980. This, however, started
to fall in the succeeding periods. In 2001 and
2002, the sector accounted for only one
Table 1. Philippine automotive sales, production, and imports
Year Sales Production/ New CBU     CBU Imports CKD Sales as %
CKD Sales  Imports as % of Total Sales   of Total Sales
1992 60,360 58,899 941 2 98
1993 83,811 82,202 1,461 2 98
1994 103,471 99,346 1,609 2 96
1995 128,162 127,016 4,125 4 99
1996 162,095 137,365 1,146 1 85
1997 144,435 120,488 24,730 15 83
1998 80,231 67,903 23,947 15 85
1999 74,414 64,635 9,779 13 87
2000 74,000 70,851 3,149 4 96
2001 76,670 65,202 11,468 15 85
2002 85,587 74,734 10,853 13 87
2003 92,336 85,388 6,948 8 92
2004 88,068 58,822 29,246 33 67
2005 97,063 58,566 38,497 40 60
2006 99,541 56,050 43,491 44 56
2007 117,903 61,128 56,775 48 52
Source: Production data from 1991 to 1996 are from the Board of Investments. Data from 2000 to
2003 are from T. Kubo (2004), Asia: climbing to the world’s largest auto industry and market, Asian
Automotive Business Review 15 No. 4. Meanwhile, 2002 to 2003 figures were adjusted to exclude
exports data. Data from 1997 to 1999 refer to sales of domestically assembled vehicles. Sales from
1990 onwards are from CAMPI and 2004–2007 sales breakdown are from TMP.PN 2008-02
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percent of total manufacturing value added.
In terms of employment contribution, the
number of workers in the sector was reduced
from 12,126 workers in 1999 to 9,698 in
2003. This represented less than one percent
of total manufacturing employment.
The industry’s export of passenger cars
increased from 12,367 units in 2003 to
14,417 in 2005 but dropped to 6,730 units in
2006. These are mostly passenger car exports
(with spark ignition combustion engine
exceeding 1500 cc but not more than 3000
cc) to Thailand and Indonesia and mainly
Ford’s exports under the ASEAN Industrial
Cooperation Scheme.
Auto parts and components
The parts and components segment of the
automotive industry is composed of 256
companies producing around 330 different
parts and components made of metals,
plastic, rubber, and composite materials. Of
the 256 automotive parts manufacturers, 124
are considered first-tier manufacturers who
are directly supplying the needs of domestic
automotive assemblers. The remaining 132 are
mostly small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
serving as second- and third-tier subcontrac-
tors who supply the needs of the first-tier
manufacturers. By the end of 1999, total
investments in the sector amounted to about
P27 billion. This increased to P28 billion in
2001. Total employment, meanwhile, was
45,000 workers in 1999 but declined to
33,000 in 2002.
The bulk of the industry is composed of small
firms with capitalization ranging from P0.5 to
P5 million. Most of these firms operate as
“mom and pop” style suppliers with varying
capabilities and some real quality problems.
These firms failed to develop as they have
insufficient capital and technology that are
necessary to improve their products. The large
firms with capitalization of more than P100
million account for only about seven percent
of the industry. They comprise the major
players of the industry and are the same
companies manufacturing parts for original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) car assemblers
and engaged in exporting activities.
Competitiveness and weak domestic
linkages
Despite the imposition of high levels of tariff
and nontariff barriers on imported CBUs for
more than two decades, the local automotive
industry has failed to develop as an efficient
industry capable of competing internationally.
At best, the local content program had only a
limited impact on the growth and develop-
ment of the parts and components industry.
Very little parts and components are sourced
locally, with the domestic parts sector ac-
Despite the imposition of high levels of tariff and
nontariff barriers on imported CBUs for more than two
decades, the local automotive industry has failed to
develop as an efficient industry capable of competing
internationally. At best, the local content program had
only a limited impact on the growth and development
of the parts and components industry.PN 2008-02
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counting for only 10 to 15 percent of the
total number of parts and components needed
by local assemblers.
The nonavailability of the necessary parts and
components domestically and the high
dependence of the industry on imported parts
have continued to add up to the assemblers’
rising costs of production. The industry’s high
cost structure has tended to price vehicles
assembled in the country out of world mar-
kets. With weak competitiveness, the linkage
of small and medium parts makers with
multinational corporations has also failed to
develop.
Auto parts are one of the country’s top three
exports. These, however, are highly concen-
trated to a few products like wiring harnesses
and transmissions which are highly import
dependent. Auto parts exports are made by
large multinational corporations (MNCs) like
Toyota Auto Parts. Backward linkages are
limited and as such, the value added of these
export activities has remained low.
Subcontracting arrangements are seen as
possible mechanisms to help improve the
competitiveness of SMEs and the ability to
create and upgrade backward linkages. The
number of subcontractors in the industry,
however, fell from 71 enterprises in 1994 to
only 22 enterprises in 2003. Total subcon-
tracted work as a percentage of the industry’s
value of output sold also declined from 0.61
percent to 0.53 percent between 1994 and
2003.
Smuggling problem
The small size of the Philippines’ domestic
market is the major factor that explains the
industry’s lack of competitiveness. This has,
however, been exacerbated by the unfair
competition from the entry of smuggled
second-hand vehicles in the Subic Bay
Freeport and other special economic zone ports.
Under Republic Act 8506, the importation of
second-hand cars has remained prohibited.
Except for imports by returning residents and
members of the diplomatic corps, used cars
cannot be imported. This prohibition has
been circumvented though through free port
zones which have been used as staging points
to allow the duty-free entry of used vehicles
in the country.
Given the relatively cheap second-hand
imported vehicles, industry sales of domestic
assemblers have been negatively affected. In
December 2002, the government legislated
Executive Order (EO) 156 to prohibit the
importation of all types of used motor ve-
hicles and parts and components at any point
of entry, including those in free port zones,
with the exception of those that may be
allowed under certain conditions. However,
for several years, EO 156 could not be en-
forced because of a temporary restraining
order issued by the Olongapo City Regional
Trial Court and a subsequent decision by the
Court of Appeals in February 2005 that
declared EO 156 to be unconstitutional and
illegal. This was however overruled by the
Supreme Court with its final decision toPN 2008-02
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prohibit the importation of second-hand
vehicles.
Table 2 compares data on imports of used
vehicles from the Land Transportation Office
(LTO) with those from the NSO compilations.
NSO imports data are based on the import
entries of used vehicles while the LTO data
refer to newly registered used imported
passenger cars, SUVs/UVs, trucks, and buses.
A substantial discrepancy is found between
the NSO and LTO figures. Note that the NSO
cumulative total of 130,740 used vehicles
represented only about one-fifth of the LTO
new registration data for used vehicles
amounting to 561,039. On the average, the
difference between the two data sets is
around 71,700 vehicles between 1998 and
2003. This large data gap between the two
data sets could indicate a rough estimate of
the volume of smuggled vehicles.
The shrinking domestically assembled CBU
sales due to the unabated entry of smuggled
second-hand vehicles that are priced 30 to 50
percent lower and the weak supplier base
have been preventing foreign automakers
from seriously considering the Philippines for
a more important role in their global produc-
tion networks (GPNs). While Ford made the
Philippines its regional hub for passenger cars
in the early 2000s, its Thai plant—the Auto
Alliance—is expanding for the assembly and
export of 100,000 units of passenger cars.
Philippines and Thailand:
a comparison
With the rising globalization and economic
integration trends, a new form of industrial
organization known as the global production
network (GPN) has emerged in the industry.
Toyota’s Innovative Multipurpose Vehicle
(IMV) Project is one such example. Under the
IMV Project, Toyota upgraded and expanded
plants in Thailand, Indonesia, Argentina, and
South Africa and turned them into assembly
and export bases for a line of IMVs. In 2005,
Japan’s first R&D center in an emerging
market, the Toyota Technical Center Asia
Pacific Thailand Co. Ltd, was opened in
Thailand.
The 1990s witnessed the emergence of
Thailand as the regional hub
not only of Toyota but of the
world’s other large automakers
such as Mitsubishi, Honda,
Auto Alliance (Ford and
Mazda), General Motors (GM),
and Isuzu. As the export
platform of these companies,
Thailand’s production in-
creased markedly from 589,126
Table 2. Used vehicle imports: NSO trade data vs. LTO registration data
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total Average
LTO newly registered
imported used vehicles 81,034 78,369 88,057 97,024 113,327 103,228 561,039 93,507
NSO imports
of used vehicles 4,480 5,112 46,384 22,071 20,967 31,726 130,740 21,790
Difference 76,554 73,257 41,673 74,953 92,360 71,502 430,299 71,717PN 2008-02
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units in 1996 to 1,176,840 in 2006. A total of
539,206 units were exported while 682,693
units represented domestic sales in 2006.
As of 2002, Thailand had 1,800 locally based
suppliers, with 700 classified as first-tier
suppliers and the remainder as second-tier
suppliers. This domestic supplier base pro-
vides engines, engine components, body
parts, brake systems, steering systems,
suspensions, transmissions, and electronics.
With a strong supplier base, Thai-based
automakers source almost 90 percent of their
parts domestically.
Aside from its stable macroeconomic environ-
ment, good infrastructure, relatively large
domestic market, and the presence of an
extensive network of components manufactur-
ers, Thailand’s success in integrating with the
GPNs of foreign auto companies has been the
product of its long years of policy reform.
From a highly protected industry orientation,
Thailand was able to successfully shift its
trade and industrial policy to an export-
oriented one in the early 1990s.
After thirty years of protection, the 1990s
witnessed the opening up of the Thai automo-
tive market. Tariff rates on both CKD kits and
CBU vehicles were reduced by more than 50
percent. With the reduction in tariff on both
CKD and CBU, the gap between domestic and
foreign automotive prices was narrowed down.
In 1992, the government again reduced the
tariff rates. Poapongsakorn and Wangdee
(2004) observed that the tariff reduction
lowered domestic automotive prices and
combined with economic expansion, auto
sales rose during the period 1991–1996,
reaching a peak level of 589,126 units.
Thailand’s tariff structure has provided higher
rates of effective protection than the Philip-
pines. In 1997, Thai assemblers had an
effective protection rate of 497 percent while
auto parts had 112 percent. In contrast, the
Philippines’ assemblers enjoyed 97 percent
effective protection while auto parts received
only 10 percent. Thailand was able to manage
its trade policy reform strategically particu-
larly in the promotion and development of
one-ton pickups. This has transformed the
Thai automotive industry into a regional hub
of many foreign automakers and the world’s
largest production base for one-ton pickups,
which is considered as Thailand’s niche
market. As Table 3 shows, pickup trucks had
always received the lowest excise tax and
tariff rates for vehicles in the last three
decades, thereupon tremenduouly reducing
their prices (Kohpaiboon 2006).
Table 3. Tariffs and excise taxes in the Thai CBUs
CBU Type Before 1992 1992 1999 2000–present
Passenger cars over 2400 cc
Tariff rate 300 68.5 80 80
Excise tax 44-55 41.8 43-50 41-48
Passenger cars under 2400 cc
Tariff rate 180 42 80 80
Excise tax 44-55 35.75 41.25 38.5
Pickup truck
Tariff rate 120 60 60 80
Excise tax 9.9 na 5.5 3.3
Source: Ministry of Finance as cited in Kohpaiboon (2006)PN 2008-02
Policy Notes
8
comprising 16 percent of total cost
and Thailand’s, only about 13 percent.
As illustrated in Figure 2, vehicles
assembled in the Philippines tend to
be more costly than those assembled
in Thailand. With a smaller scale of
operations and with only 23 percent
local content, production costs for the
Philippines run about 1.4 times higher
than those in Thailand where local
content accounted for a much higher
rate at 67 percent of total production
cost. The ratio declines to 1.2 if the
vehicle is imported as a completely
built unit to the Philippines due to
the inclusion of a 5 percent import
tariff and logistics costs.
Globalization and the need for
industry adjustment measures
Strong political will to effectively enforce EO
156 is foremost needed to address the smug-
gling issue. Aside from stopping smuggling,
the government also has to play an important
role in strengthening the industry. Govern-
ment coordination with the private sector,
workers, academe, and other concerned
groups is important to move the industry
forward. Support from all sectors is needed to
formulate a more coherent set of policies and
comprehensive strategy and program that will
enhance industry competitiveness and en-
courage the industry to specialize and expand
in market segments where it is closest to
being internationally competitive. To benefit
from the economic integration process, a lot
Figure 2 compares the cost of manufacturing a
particular vehicle model in the Philippines
and Thailand and illustrates a considerable
difference in the cost of production between
the two countries. The cost differences and
inefficiency of the vehicle assembly industry
in the Philippines may be explained by the
firms’ low-volume production and the absence
of a strong supplier base, as previously noted.
Imported raw materials consist of multi-
supplied parts (MSP) manufactured in Thai-
land and supplied components from Japan.
These account for about 61 percent of the
total production cost in the Philippines while
in Thailand, these comprise only 20 percent.
Due to the Philippines’ small level of opera-
tions, its assembly costs are higher than
those in Thailand, with the Philippines’ costs
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depends on the response of global automotive
companies and domestic firms.
While the country’s current limited domestic
market prevents assemblers from reaping the
benefits of mass production, the removal of
tariff and nontariff barriers through the AFTA
is an important step in creating a market that
is of sufficient size to allow economies of
scale in production and provide incentives for
investment.
To enable firms to cope with a zero tariff
environment by 2010, though, the govern-
ment needs to design temporary industry
adjustment measures and incentives to
expand the market for both assembled ve-
hicles and parts and to improve the firms’
performance and competitiveness. The mea-
sures should enable the industry to face
competition arising from zero tariffs from
AFTA by 2010 as well as to facilitate its
integration into the regional/global produc-
tion networks of foreign automakers. There
are seven car assemblers manufacturing
eighteen models at a total of around 60,000
units. The average production per model is
around 3,300 units which is very small. As
one top auto executive noted, it would be
difficult to compete in a zero tariff environ-
ment with this scale of production unless
certain adjustment measures and incentives
are formulated.
The development of parts and components
and the manufacture of vehicles for both the
domestic and export markets seem to be the
best way to integrate the industry into the
global automotive industry and to link
domestic auto parts companies, especially the
SMEs, with regional production networks.
Incentives should be provided only to poten-
tially viable domestic manufacturing firms
that are deemed capable of adjusting. The
incentives should be based on manufacturing
volume and conditioned on a firm’s scale of
operations. They should only be for a limited
time to ensure that only the most efficient
firms will be given temporary support. The
incentives should also be conditioned on
performance indicators such as the firms’
ability to increase their productivity whose
gains will eventually be passed on to consum-
ers in terms of lower prices that could further
stimulate demand. Monitoring and regular
evaluation should be carried out to ensure
that the objectives are being attained and
programs effectively implemented.
The government needs to design a complete
package of technical, financial, marketing,
and human resource development for the auto
parts sector consisting mainly of SMEs. It
likewise has to set up programs to strengthen
and link local parts and components with
MNCs. Support to SMEs should not be through
increased tariff protection but through the
provision of access to capital and technology
which are at the root of their underdevelop-
ment. Given the parts suppliers’ limited
technology and R&D capability, finding
technologically fit foreign partners will be a
critical move. The active participation of thePN 2008-02
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industry association will be needed in this
endeavor.
Cluster development is also one way to
develop internal and external linkages.
Clusters are important in improving firm
competitiveness and broadening the local
supply base. At present, the industry is
implementing the “ECOP-Big Enterprise, Small
Enterprise” (EBESE) Program, with Toyota
Motor Philippines Corporation taking the lead
in strengthening the capacities of its suppli-
ers. Increased involvement and commitment
from other industry members, along with an
allocation of sufficient government funds for
the program to make it more sustainable, is
thus necessary.
Conclusions
Active government support for market expan-
sion is crucial as firms adjust toward a zero
tariff environment. Strong political will is
needed to curb smuggling. Without resolving
the smuggling issue and formulating an
adjustment program to help the industry
during the transition process, the possibility
is high that existing assemblers might shift to
CBU trading. This poses potential dangers of
further eroding the country’s manufacturing
base.
The government has an important role to play
in formulating, implementing, monitoring,
and coordinating a coherent set of strategic
policies to help domestic firms adjust to the
changing international and regional economic
environment. One important lesson from our
trade policy reform in the 1990s is that
unilateral trade liberalization alone is not
sufficient to improve industry competitive-
ness. Policy coordination at all levels and an
adjustment strategy to help firms cope with
the new policy environment are necessary.
Comprehensive measures are vital in strength-
ening the domestic automotive assembly and
parts industry and in enabling them to take
advantage of the opportunities arising from
globalization, in general, and the AFTA, in
particular. Since the zero tariff environment
under the AFTA-CEPT is barely two years away,
implementing these adjustment measures at
the earliest time possible is extremely impor-
tant. This may be the industry’s last chance,
but there is hope that with the correct
strategy and its effective implementation, the
Philippines can still make it. 
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